Jury Instructions on Joint and Several Liability in Washington State by Weaver, Julie K.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 67 Number 2 
4-1-1992 
Jury Instructions on Joint and Several Liability in Washington 
State 
Julie K. Weaver 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Julie K. Weaver, Comment, Jury Instructions on Joint and Several Liability in Washington State, 67 Wash. 
L. Rev. 457 (1992). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol67/iss2/6 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Copyright (D 1992 by Washington Law Review Association
JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON JOINT AND SEVERAL
LIABILITY IN WASHINGTON STATE
Abstract. Neither the Washington Legislature nor the Washington Supreme Court has
addressed the issue of instructing a jury on Washington's doctrine of modified joint and
several liability and its effects. Historically, most states prevented courts from instructing
juries on the effects of their answers to special verdicts. Washington, however, has no
history of keeping a jury uninformed of the effects of its answers. This Comment con-
cludes that Washington courts should continue the practice of informing juries of the
effects of their answers and instruct juries on joint and several liability and its effects.
Two cars collide on an isolated stretch of highway in Washington
State. Ann Nickel is severely injured in the accident. Bob English's
car crossed the center line while rounding a sharp curve and collided
with Ann's car as she rounded the curve traveling the opposite direc-
tion. Ann brings suit in a Washington State court, alleging that both
Bob's negligent driving and the State's negligent design of the highway
were proximate causes of her injuries.
Under Washington's modified doctrine of joint and several liability,
joint liability between defendants exists only if the plaintiff is free from
fault. The existence of joint liability allows a plaintiff to recover the
whole judgment from a single defendant. The determination of joint
liability thus has great significance to both the plaintiff and the defend-
ants. In Washington, however, the law on informing the jury of joint
and several liability and its consequences is unclear. Neither the
Washington courts nor the Legislature has addressed the issue of
whether courts may inform juries about joint and several liability.
If courts may not instruct juries on joint and several liability, the
jury's assignment of a small percentage of fault either to the State or to
Ann may have unintended consequences. Two examples of jury out-
comes highlight these consequences. One possible result of Ann's suit
against Bob and the State is the assignment of no fault to Ann, one
percent of fault to the State and ninety-nine percent of the fault to
Bob. If Bob is insolvent, the State, through its joint liability, must pay
the entire damage award. Another possible outcome of Ann's suit is
the jury assigning one percentage point of fault to both Ann and the
State, and assigning the remaining ninety-eight percent to Bob. Even
if Bob is insolvent, the State is liable only for the percentage of the
harm attributed to its negligence, and Ann may recover only one per-
cent of her damages. Because of these possible consequences, both the
State and Ann may wish an instruction on joint and several liability.
After discussing Washington's tort system and the instruction of
Washington juries in tort actions, this Comment examines how other
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states have addressed informing juries of the effects of their answers in
tort actions. Historically, most state courts did not allow instruction
of juries on the effects of their answers to special verdicts.' Many
states altered this rule, however, and allow courts to inform juries of
the effects of modified comparative negligence.2 Several states have
applied the reasoning of these modified comparative negligence deci-
sions to the doctrine of joint and several liability. Most of these deci-
sions have allowed courts to inform juries of the doctrine.
This Comment concludes that Washington should also allow courts
to inform juries of the doctrine of joint and several liability and its
effects. The problems created by the Washington courts' failure to
inform juries of Washington joint and several liability law are analo-
gous to the problems found by courts in modified comparative negli-
gence states. As in these states, the solution to these problems is to
permit courts to inform juries of the effects of their answers. In addi-
tion, allowing courts to inform juries is consistent with past Washing-
ton practice. Finally, an informed jury's determination of the
liabilities of the parties better assures accomplishment of the objectives
of Washington tort reform.
I. WASHINGTON TORT LAW
Washington. tort law is, in some respects, unusual. The distinctive
features include the state's pure comparative fault system3 and its
modification of the common law doctrine of joint and several liability. 4
Although Washington tort law differs in some ways from tort law in
other states, the general principles followed in Washington are the
same.
A. The Law of Comparative Negligence in Washington
Under the common law, the doctrine of contributory negligence
requires a verdict for the defendant when the jury finds the plaintiff's
conduct contributed to the plaintiff's injuries.5 This doctrine places
the entire burden for an injury on the plaintiff when both the defend-
1. See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 41-46 and
accompanying text (explaining the use of special verdicts).
2. See infra notes 52-68 and accompanying text.
3. In 1981, the Washington Legislature enacted comparative fault. Comparative fault is
broader than comparative negligence and includes actions involving products liability and strict
tort liability. See Act of April 17, 1981, ch. 27, § 9, 1981 Wash. Laws 112, 117 (codified at
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.015 (West 1989)). The differences between comparative
negligence and comparative fault are beyond the scope of this Comment.
4. See infra notes 13-22 and accompanying text.
5. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToRTS 416-18 (4th ed. 1971).
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ant and the plaintiff are responsible.6 The harsh consequences of the
doctrine led states to alter the common law and adopt comparative
negligence.7
State legislatures adopting comparative negligence have a choice
between adopting modified or pure comparative negligence. Modified
comparative negligence allows the plaintiff to recover only when the
plaintiff's own negligence is less than a specific percentage of the negli-
gence of all parties.' One variation of modified comparative negli-
gence requires that the plaintiff be less negligent than the defendant.'
Under this formulation, the plaintiff's negligence must be forty-nine
percent or less in order to recover damages. The second variation of
modified comparative negligence requires that the plaintiff's negli-
gence not be greater than the defendant's. This allows a plaintiff who
the jury finds to be fifty percent or less at fault to recover damages.10
Washington adopted the pure form of comparative negligence in
1973.1 Pure comparative negligence allows the plaintiff to recover the
percentage of harm attributed to the defendant's negligence, regardless
of the percentage of fault attributed to the plaintiff.12
B. The Doctrine of Joint and Several Liability in Washington
Under common law joint and several liability, multiple tortfeasors
who cause an indivisible injury are each liable for the entire harm. 3
Because each defendant is liable for the total damage award, the plain-
tiff may demand payment from a single defendant. After paying the
damages, the chosen defendant is then left to seek contribution from
the other defendants.14 The ability to recover the whole award from a
single defendant is particularly important where one defendant is
6. Id. at 433.
7. Id.;see also Act of April 17, 1981, ch. 27, § 1, 1981 Wash. Laws 112, 112 (modification of
tort law to ameliorate harsh common law doctrines); David C. Sobelsohn, "Pure" vs. "Modified"
Comparative Fault: Notes on the Debate, 34 EMORY L.J. 65, 65-66 (1985).
8. Sobelsohn, supra note 7, at 67.
9. Id. at 67-68.
10. Id.; see also infra notes 52-68 and accompanying text (discussing the instruction of juries
on modified comparative negligence).
11. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.05 (West 1989); see also Sobelsohn, supra note 7, at 68;
Thomas R. Trenkner, Annotation, Modern Development of Comparative Negligence Doctrine
Having Applicability to Negligence Actions Generally, 78 A.L.R.3D 339 (1977). Pure comparative
negligence is the minority approach. As of 1990, of the 45 states adopting comparative
negligence, only 14 states and Puerto Rico had adopted the pure form. ARTHUR BEST ET AL.,
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 2.30 (Barry D. Denkensohn et al. eds., Supp. 1990).
12. See Sobelsohn, supra note 7, at 68.
13. See PROSSER, supra note 5, at 297.
14. See id. at 307.
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insolvent or lacks the resources to pay his or her percentage of the
award.15
The Washington Legislature altered the common law doctrine of
joint and several liability in the Tort Reform Act of 1986.16 In gen-
eral, joint liability between multiple defendants exists under the Tort
Reform Act only when the plaintiff is entirely free from fault.17
The Legislature passed the Tort Reform Act to reduce the cost of
insurance.18 The Legislature found that the then..existing tort system
escalated the costs of insurance. The increased insurance costs dis-
couraged private businesses and organizations from engaging in
socially and economically desirable activities, and caused governmen-
tal entities to reduce services.19 The application of joint and several
liability allows collection of the entire damage award from businesses
and government entities that may be only a small percentage at fault.
For example, accidents on state highways, such as the accident
between Ann and Bob described earlier, may involve a one or two
percent allocation of fault to the State. Each time the state is found a
small percentage at fault, however, it may have to pay the entire dam-
age award.
The Legislature was persuaded that by placing liability on defend-
ants only marginally responsible for the plaintiff's harm, the then
existing tort system created losses so large that the insurers of govern-
ment and business were forced to raise their rates.20 To lower rates,
the Legislature eliminated the application of joint and several liability
15. See Larry Pressler & Kevin V. Schieffer, Joint and Several Liability: A Case for Reform,
64 DENV. U. L. REV. 651, 652 (1988).
16. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.070(l)(b) (West 1989). In the Tort Reform Act of 1986,
the Washington Legislature gave the word "several" a meaning different from the word's
meaning under common law joint and several liability. At the common law, a party's several
liability was for the total amount of the plaintiff's damages. In the first paragraph of section
4.22.070(1), "several" means that party's share of the total damages as determined by the
proportion of that party's fault to the total fault of all parties and entities. In section l(b),
however, "several" means the sum of the amounts for which all of tha defendants are liable. This
second meaning is different from the meaning used in the first paragraph and the common law
meaning.
17. Id. § 4.22.070. The Act, however, excepts cases involving certain types of activity. Joint
liability exists under section l(a) for persons acting in concert and fcr employers and employees.
Id. Joint liability is also preserved for specific categories of cases listed under section 3. Id.
18. Act of April 4, 1986, ch. 305, § 100, 1986 Wash. Laws 1354, 1354. "The purpose of this
chapter is to enact further reforms in order to ... increase the availability and affordability of
insurance." Id.
19. Id.; see generally, Pressler & Schieffer, supra note 15, at 654-50 (many states have altered
joint and several liability as a method of reducing the tort liability burdening deep pockets).
20. See Act of April 4, 1986, ch. 305, § 100, 1986 Wash. Laws 1354, 1354; Cornelius J. Peck,
Washington's Partial Rejection and Modification of the Common Law Rule of Joint and Several
Liability, 62 WASH. L. REV. 233, 238 (1987).
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when the plaintiff was partially responsible for the harm. The Legisla-
ture hoped to decrease the losses of insurance companies, enabling
them to charge lower premiums."1 Evidently, the Legislature believed
lower premiums would allow government to use the savings to provide
services and businesses to continue operation.'
As a result of the Tort Reform Act, defendants facing joint liability
now have great incentive to persuade the jury that the plaintiff is
somewhat at fault. When the jury finds the plaintiff at fault, even if
the fault is marginal, each defendant is liable only for the proportion
of the damage award corresponding to the share of the total fault
assigned to that defendant. A plaintiff who may be unable to recover
from the main defendant will want the jury to know the incentive
behind the other defendants' argument that the plaintiff bears some
fault.
C. Instructing a Jury in Washington
Washington courts have not yet addressed the issue of informing the
jury when special verdicts are used. Washington court practice, how-
ever, allows trial courts discretion in their submission of special ver-
dicts and in their instructions to the jury. Trial courts have used their
discretion in choosing types of verdicts and in providing instructions
informing juries of the effects of their answers in some situations.
1. Forms of Verdicts in Washington
Washington courts have the discretion to choose the type of verdict
submitted to the jury. 3 Under Washington Court Rule 49, the court
may submit general verdicts, general verdicts with interrogatories, or
special verdicts.2 4 While courts generally submit a general verdict in
most cases, the Washington comparative fault statute requires the jury
to make specific findings of fault in negligence cases. 25  To accomplish
this, courts generally submit special verdict forms to the jury that
require specific answers regarding each party's fault.26
21. See Peck, supra note 20, at 238.
22. See Act of April 4, 1986, ch. 305, § 100, 1986 Wash. Laws 1354, 1354.
23. WASH. Cr. R. 49.
24. Id.
25. WASH. Rv. CODE ANN. § 4.22.070(1) (West 1989). In a negligence action, the jury
must determine the percentage of the total fault attributable to every entity causing the
claimant's damages. Id. The entity requirement allows the jury to assign fault to non-parties.
Id.
26. See, e.g., Garcia v. Brulotte, 94 Wash. 2d 794, 620 P.2d 99 (1980); see generally BEST et
al., supra note 11, § 3.40 (explaining the general method of submitting damage questions to the
jury). The Washington Pattern Jury Instructions reflect this general practice. The special verdict
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2. Washington Courts Have Discretion in the Instructions Provided
to the Jury
Washington courts must present instructions that allow each party
to argue their theory of a case.27 The form of the instruction, how-
ever, is discretionary.28 Courts may confine their instructions to spe-
cific aspects of law or may give abstract instructions.29 Courts are not
allowed to give an abstract instruction, however, if the instruction
might mislead or confuse the jury. 0
Washington courts have used this discretion to give abstract instruc-
tions in negligence cases. Two examples of this discretion are courts'
instructions to juries on the doctrines of contributory negligence and
assumption of risk. In the past, the existence of either doctrine com-
pletely barred recovery by the plaintiff.31 The Washington Supreme
Court has repeatedly upheld instructions on contributory negligence
as proper.32 Similarly, Washington courts have consistently instructed
juries on the doctrine of assumption of risk and its effects.13
3. Washington Has Not Addressed Whether Juries Should Be
Informed of Joint and Several Liability
Neither the Washington Legislature nor the courts have addressed
the issue of informing a jury of the effects of special verdicts. In Sofie
v. Fibreboard Corp., 34 however, the Washington Supreme Court noted
forms developed for the Tort Reform Act ask the jury to determine which entities are negligent
and to assign a percentage of fault to each negligent entity. wAsHINGTON SUPREME COURT
COMMITrEE ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 6 WASHINGTON PRACTICE, WASHINGTON PATTERN
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL 45.20-45.27 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter WASHINGTON PATTERN
JURY INSTRUCTIONS].
27. Farm Crop Energy, Inc. v. Old Nat'l Bank, 109 Wash. 2d 923, 932, 750 P.2d 231, 237
(1988).
28. See id. at 932, 750 P.2d at 237.
29. See Bennington v. Northern Pac. Ry., 113 Wash. 1, 6, 192 P. 1073, 1075 (1920). An
abstract instruction is a general statement of a legal principle. Id. Abstract instructions are
discretionary. See State v. O'Connell, 83 Wash. 2d 797, 810, 523 P.2d 872, 882 (1974), overruled
by Scott Fetzer Co. v. Weeks, 114 Wash. 2d 109, 786 P.2d 265 (1990); see also Lloyd L. Wiehl,
Instructing a Jury In Washington, 36 WASH. L. REv. 378, 383-85 (1961) (abstract instructions
are generally sufficient).
30. Herndon v. Seattle, 11 Wash. 2d 88, 104, 118 P.2d 421, 429 (1941).
31. Prior to 1987, assumption of risk was a complete bar to recovery. See, eg., Lyons v.
Redding Constr. Co., 83 Wash. 2d 86, 95, 515 P.2d 821, 826 (1973). In 1987, implied
assumption of risk was held to be a damage reducing factor in negligence actions. Kirk v.
Washington State Univ., 109 Wash. 2d 448, 457-58, 746 P.2d 285, 289-91 (1987).
32. See Owens v. Kuro, 56 Wash. 2d 564, 354 P.2d 696 (1960); Case v. Peterson, 17 Wash.
2d 523, 527, 136 P.2d 192, 194 (1943).
33. See Kirk 109 Wash. 2d at 458, 746 P.2d at 291; Martin v. Kidwiler, 71 Wash. 2d 47, 50,
426 P.2d 489, 491 (1967).
34. 112 Wash. 2d 636, 771 P.2d 711, opinion amended, 780 P.2d 260 (1989).
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that the trial judge instructed the jury to apply common law joint and
several liability to the defendants.35 The court in Sofie did not discuss
whether this instruction or an instruction on Washington's modified
joint and several liability is permissible. The court, however, indicated
that the Legislature may prescribe the factors that a jury may consider
in determining liability.3 6
Unlike other states,37 Washington has no history of keeping a jury
uninformed. To the contrary, Washington courts historically have
informed juries of the consequences of their answers. Washington
courts never addressed the problems created in modified comparative
negligence cases when a jury is not informed of the effects of its
answers because Washington adopted the pure form of comparative
negligence. As a result, Washington has no case law to draw upon in
this area.
II. TREATMENT OF INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THE
EFFECTS OF ITS ANSWERS TO SPECIAL
VERDICTS IN OTHER STATES
Beginning in the nineteenth century, courts and legislatures devel-
oped a rule barring courts from informing juries of the effects of their
special verdict findings.3 8 Washington never adopted this rule. Many
states that adopted the rule against informing juries discarded it after
they adopted comparative negligence. 9 Judicial decisions eliminating
the rule in comparative negligence cases formed the foundation for
decisions by several state courts eliminating the rule in joint and sev-
eral liability cases.'
35. Id. at 667, 771 P.2d at 727. The Sofie case required the application of common law joint
and several liability because the case involved an exception under section 4.22.070(3). In Sofie,
the Washington Supreme Court held unconstitutional a provision in the Tort Reform Act of
1986 that placed a cap on the recovery of economic damages and required that courts not inform
juries of this cap. Id. at 650-51, 771 P.2d at 719. The court did not directly address the
requirement that courts not instruct the jury on the damage cap.
36. Id. at 666, 771 P.2d at 727.
37. See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
38. Throughout the remainder of this Comment, the prohibition against informing the jury of
the effects of its answers to special verdicts will be referred to as the rule against informing juries.
39. See infra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 69-85 and accompanying text.
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A. The Rule Against Informing Juries of the Effects of Their
Answers to Special Verdicts
1. The Use of Special Verdicts
Special verdicts require that the jury answer specific factual ques-
tions and leave the determination of the outcome of the case to the
court that applies the law to the jury's findings of fact.41 Special ver-
dicts help the jury reach their findings of fact by providing a logical
framework for their deliberations, and aid appellate courts by creating
a record of the jury's findings on each issue.42
The special verdict is fundamental to comparative negligence.43
With a special verdict, the jury assigns a percentage of fault to each of
the parties and determines the total damages.4  Interrogatories 45 and
special verdicts assure the court that the jury has determined the fault
of each party, and help the court make the final al.location of damages
between the parties. 46 Once the jury answers the questions in the spe-
cial verdict, the court applies the law to the jury's answers, reducing
any damage award by the percentage of fault attributed to the plaintiff.
2. Historical Treatment of Informing Juries of the Effects of Their
Answers to Special Verdicts
Historically, most states barred their courts from informing juries of
the effects of their special verdicts.47 The rule against informing the
jury developed before the turn of the century in the courts of Wiscon-
sin.48 Other states also adopted the rule against informing49 and by
41. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1560 (6th ed. 1990).
42. See Stuart F. Schaffer, Comment, Informing the Jury of the Legal Effect of Special
Verdict Answers in Comparative Negligence Actions, 1981 DUKE L.J. 824, 827-28.
43. Id. at 829.
44. See Sobelsohn, supra note 7, at 66-68; Note, Informing the Jury of the Effect of Its
Answers to Special Verdict Questions-The Minnesota Experience, 58 MINN. L. REV. 903,
903-04 (1974); see also WASHINGTON PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 26,
45.20-45.27.
45. When a court submits a general verdict it may also require the jury to answer questions
set forth in interrogatories. See WASH. CT. R. 49(b).
46. Id.
47. See Schaffer, supra note 42, at 832.
48. Ryan v. Rockford Ins. Co., 46 N.W. 885, 886 (Wis. 1890); see generally D.A. Cox,
Annotation, Reversible Effect of Informing Jury of the Effect that Their Answers to Special
Interrogatories or Special Issues May Have Upon Ultimate Liability or Judgment, 90 A.L.R.2D
1040 (1963).
49. See McCourtie v. United States Steel Co., 93 N.W.2d 552, 562-63 (Minn. 1958);
Harbison v. Briggs Bros. Paint Mfg. Co., 354 S.W.2d 464, 471 (Tenn. 1962), overruled by Ennix
v. Clay, 703 S.W.2d 137 (Tenn. 1986); McFaddin v. Herbert, 15 S.W.2d 213, 217-18 (Tex. 1929);
McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co., 529 P.2d 423, 424 (Utah 1974), overruled by Dixon v.
Stewart 658 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982).
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the 1970s, the rule against informing had become the majority rule. °
Courts and commentators in favor of a rule against informing believe
that informing a jury defeats the impartiality created by special ver-
dicts because it allows the jury to manipulate their answers to produce
a desired result."
B. The Growth of Comparative Negligence and the Decline of the
Rule Against Informing Juries
As states adopted comparative negligence, courts and lawmakers
began re-evaluating the rule against informing juries. 2 Under modi-
fied comparative negligence systems, plaintiffs may not recover when
their proportion of negligence reaches a specified percentage." An
uninformed jury will not know this rule and therefore has no knowl-
edge of the significance of their assignment of fault. Many states
adopting modified comparative negligence eliminated the rule against
informing juries because modified comparative negligence's cut-off
point can frustrate the jury's decision to allow partial recovery. 4
Some states eliminated the rule by statute.5" Others eliminated the
rule judicially. 6
50. Schaffer, supra note 42, at 832-33; Michael J. Norton, Comment, McGinn v. Utah Power
& Light Co.-Jury Blindfolding in Comparative Negligence Cases, 1975 Utah L. Rev. 569, 572.
51. See Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S.
816 (1948); McCourtie, 93 N.W.2d at 563; Ryan, 46 N.W. at 886; see also Note, supra note 44, at
906-08.
52. Schaffer, supra note 42, at 836-37.
53. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
54. See Elliot Talenfeld, Instructing the Jury as to the Effect of Joint and Several Liability:
Time for the Court to Address the Issue on the Merits, 20 ARIz. ST. L.J. 925, 933 (1988).
55. Two states mandate a general verdict, thus requiring courts to inform the jury of the law
and its application. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:7d (Supp. 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 1036 (1973). Statutes or court rules in five states require that juries be informed of the effect of
their answers to special verdicts or interrogatories assigning fault. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-
111.5(5) (1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-31(d) (1985); MINN. R. Civ. P. 49.01(2) (Supp. 1991);
OR. REV. STAT. § 18.480(2) (1991); Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1991). Finally, one state allows the
court to inform the jury of the effect of its assignment of fault upon request of a party. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1987).
56. See Seppi v. Betty, 579 P.2d 683, 692 (Idaho 1978); Reese v. Werts Corp., 379 N.W.2d 1,
3 (Iowa 1985); Thomas v. Board of Township Trustees, 582 P.2d 271, 280 (Kan. 1978); Wing v.
Morse, 300 A.2d 491, 501 (Me. 1973); Thurston v. Ballou, 505 N.E.2d 888, 891 (Mass. App. Ct.
1987); Martel v. Montana Power Co., 752 P.2d 140, 146 (Mont. 1988); Roman v. Mitchell, 413
A.2d 322, 327 (N.J. 1980); Schabe v. Hampton Bays Union Free Sch. Dist., 480 N.Y.S.2d 328,
336 (1984); Smith v. Gizzi, 564 P.2d 1009, 1013 (Okla. 1977); Peair v. Home Ass'n of Enola
Legion No. 751, 430 A.2d 665, 671-72 (Pa. Super. 1981); Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591,
596-97 (Utah 1982); Adkins v. Whitten, 297 S.E.2d 881, 884 (W. Va. 1982).
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The Idaho Supreme Court was the first to discuss the problem of
informing the jury under modified comparative negligence.57 In Seppi
v. Betty,5 the Idaho court held that instructions on the effects of com-
parative negligence are warranted where they would not mislead or
confuse the jury or create undue complexity. 9 Most of the states
rejecting the rule against informing adopted the Seppi court's
reasoning.
The Seppi court believed that the rule against informing produces
erroneous results by creating traps for the uninformed jury.' A fifty-
fifty allocation of fault is naturally attractive in negligence cases where
the jury members cannot agree or where it is clear that both parties
were negligent. 61 The natural attractiveness of a fifty-fifty finding may
create a trap by placing the defense counsel in a position to exploit the
attractiveness of a fifty-fifty finding. The defense may encourage the
jury to split the allocation of fault and neither the court nor plaintiff's
counsel may advise the jury of the consequences.62 The Seppi court
argued that this possible deception is a trap that allows the unin-
formed jury to believe it is fairly compensating the plaintiff while it is
actually returning a verdict for the defendant.63
A second trap is created when a jury mistakenly believes its percent-
age allocation of fault allows the plaintiff to recover that percentage of
the plaintiff's damages. The Seppi court observed that a jury's deci-
sion to allocate fault reflects their decision on the damages the plaintiff
should recover.' Trial courts ask juries to apportion the negligence
between the parties and to determine the plaintiff's damages.65 This
request is likely to lead juries to speculate that their apportionment of
damage to the plaintiff will reduce the plaintiff's recovery by the same
amount.66 The Seppi court reasoned that withholding information
about the cut-off point in modified comparative negligence misleads
the jury into believing that any determination of fault below 100 per-
cent will allow the plaintiff to recover some damages.67 The Seppi
57. Two courts allowed informing the jury prior to Seppi. However, neither discussed the
rule or cited precedent. ing, 300 A.2d at 501; Smith, 564 P.2d at 1012-13.
58. 579 P.2d 683 (Idaho 1978).
59. Id. at 692.
60. Id. at 689-90.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 690.
65. Id.; see WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 26, 11.01.
66. Seppi, 579 P.2d at 690.
67. Id.
466
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court stated that an informed jury will more carefully consider the
facts before allocating fault and, therefore, the decision will accurately
reflect the wisdom of the jury, not the jury's ignorance of the law.68
C. The Elimination of the Rule Against Informing in Joint and
Several Liability Cases
Few states have addressed whether courts should inform juries of
the effects of joint and several liability.69 Of those states that have
addressed the issue, a majority have allowed informing.7 ° Two states,
however, have prohibited courts from informing the jury of joint and
several liability, one through judicial decision and the other
legislatively.71
Decisions allowing courts to inform juries contain reasoning similar
to that used by courts allowing instruction on modified comparative
negligence. 72 These arguments fall into two general categories. First,
several state courts hold that the same policy arguments applicable to
modified comparative negligence apply to joint and several liability.73
These courts reason that a jury shaping its verdict based on a false
impression of the law presents a danger in both modified comparative
negligence and joint and several liability cases.74 According to these
courts, both doctrines create a trap for the uninformed jury.7 5 These
68. Id. at 690-91. Courts abolishing the rule after the Seppi decision have made additional
arguments. Courts have noted that the design of prior law was to allow the jury to deliberate
with full knowledge of the consequences of its decisions and these courts have held that the
introduction of comparative negligence does not require a newfound distrust of the jury
warranting the exclusion of information on the effects of the jury's answers. See Peair v. Home
Ass'n of Enola Legion No. 751, 430 A.2d 665, 672 (Pa. Super. 1981); Adkins v. Whitten, 297
S.E.2d 881, 883 (W. Va. 1982). Courts have also held that they are compelled by their state's
rules of civil procedure, prior judicial decision, or the comparative negligence statute itself to give
an instruction on the law that is applicable to the facts of the case. See Adkins, 297 S.E.2d at
884; Johnson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 568 P.2d 908, 911-12 (Wyo. 1977). Finally, some courts
argue that it is erroneous to assume a biased jury or one that cannot perform its duty without
yielding to passion or prejudice. See Thomas v. Board of Township Trustees, 582 P.2d 271, 280
(Kan. 1978); Adkins, 297 S.E.2d at 884.
69. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-111.5(5) (1989); Kaeo v. Davis, 719 P.2d 387 (Haw. 1986);
Luna v. Shockey Sheet Metal & Welding Co., 743 P.2d 61 (Idaho 1987); Reese v. Werts Corp.,
379 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 1985); DeCelles v. State ex reL Dept. of Highways, 795 P.2d 419 (Mont.
1990); Valentine v. Wheeling Elec. Co., 376 S.E.2d 588 (W. Va. 1988); Coryell v. Town of
Pinedale, 745 P.2d 883 (Wyo. 1987) (superseded by statute).
70. See infra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
71. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-111.5(5) (1989) specifically prevents instruction on the effects
of the jury's answers on defendants.
72. See supra notes 52-68 and accompanying text.
73. Kaeo, 719 P.2d at 395; Luna, 743 P.2d at 64-5; DeCelles, 795 P.2d at 421.
74. See Kaeo, 719 P.2d at 396; Luna, 743 P.2d at 64; DeCelles, 795 P.2d at 421.
75. See Luna, 743 P.2d at 65; DeCelles, 795 P.2d at 421.
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courts believe that the trial court is in the best position to avoid this
danger by informing the jury of the true operation of the law.7 6
A second group of state courts permitting the informing of juries
base their decision upon procedural requirements. Courts in Iowa and
Wyoming interpret their comparative negligence statutes as requiring
the court to inform the jury of the consequences of their answers, 77
including the effects of their apportionment under the doctrine of joint
and several liability.78
Two other state courts have used procedural rules to support their
decision to allow informing the jury. The Hawaii and Montana courts
cited consistency with their state rules of civil procedure as one reason
to allow informing the jury.7 9 Under each state's rule, the court must
give the jury such explanation and instruction as may be necessary to
enable the jury to find on each issue.80 Both courts cited the consis-
tency between the state's rule and informing the jury, but neither court
provided an analysis of why the rules were consistent or why the con-
sistency was significant.81 Contrary to Montana, Idaho, and Hawaii,
the West Virginia Supreme Court found the reasoning used to allow
informing the jury of comparative negligence was inapplicable to joint
and several liability. In Valentine v. Wheeling Electric Co., 2 the court
held that because comparative negligence had not changed the doc-
trine of joint and several liability, the court's earlier decision to allow
instruction of a jury in a comparative negligence action was inapplica-
ble to informing the jury of joint and several liability. 3 In addition,
the West Virginia court found that the issue that joint and several lia-
bility presented was distinguishable from the issue that modified com-
parative negligence presented. 4 The West Virginia court held that its
earlier decision that trial courts could inform juries of comparative
76. See Kaeo, 719 P.2d at 396; Luna, 743 P.2d at 64-65; DeCelles, 795 P.2d at 421.
77. IOWA CODE § 668.3(5) (1987); Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-109(2)(B) (1988).
78. Reese v. Werts Corp., 379 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 1985); Coryell v. Town of Pinedale, 745
P.2d 883, 886 (Wyo. 1987) (superseded by statute).
79. Kaeo, 719 P.2d at 396; DeCelles, 795 P.2d at 421.
80. MoNT. R. Civ. P. 49(a); HAW. R. Civ. P. 49(a). The wording of both Montana's and
Hawaii's rule 49 is substantially the same as WAsH. CT. R. 49.
81. Kaeo, 719 P.2d at 396; DeCelles, 795 P.2d at 421.
82. 376 S.E.2d 588 (W. Va. 1988).
83. Id. at 592 (citing Adkins v. Whitten, 297 S.E.2d 881 (W. Va. 1982) (courts may instruct
juries on modified comparative negligence); Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879,
886 (W. Va. 1979) (adoption of comparative negligence did not alter joint and several liability)).
84. Id. Modified comparative negligence deals with measuring the negligence of the plaintiff
against that of the defendants. Joint and several liability deals with the apportionment of
damages among the defendants.
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negligence was not applicable to joint and several liability because the
issues are different.8"
III. WASHINGTON COURTS SHOULD INFORM THE JURY
OF THE EFFECTS OF JOINT AND SEVERAL
LIABILITY
Washington courts should inform juries about joint and several lia-
bility. The decisions of states eliminating the rule against informing
juries in comparative negligence actions are persuasive because Wash-
ington's form of joint and several liability creates pitfalls and traps for
the jury that are similar to those that modified comparative negligence
created. Additionally, the policy of Washington tort reform legisla-
tion and the state's prior jury instruction practices indicate that courts
should inform juries of the effects of their answers.
A. A Rule Against Informing the Jury Is Likely to Produce
Erroneous Results
Washington's joint and several liability system may create errone-
ous results by misleading the uninformed jury. An uninformed jury
may inadvertently deny or impose joint liability resulting in the altera-
tion of the jury's true determinations of liability. The jury's determi-
nations of liability may also be changed when a party misleads the jury
into the creation or denial of joint liability or when the uninformed
jury speculates on the effects of its answers to special verdicts.
1. Failing to Inform the Jury of Washington's Joint and Several
Liability Creates a Trap for Both Plaintiffs and
Defendants
As in modified comparative negligence systems, Washington's joint
and several liability system can create a trap for the uninformed jury.
The natural tendency of juries to concern themselves with the effects
of their answers, noted by the Seppi court, creates a trap for the jury
under both doctrines. 6 The jury believes it is making a rational deci-
sion when, in truth, the decision may produce unforeseen and irra-
tional results. In comparative negligence systems, courts find the
system's cut-off point may lead an uninformed jury inadvertently to
deny recovery. 7 Washington's joint and several liability system also
has an arbitrary cut-off point. Assignment of one percent of fault to
85. Id.
86. See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
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the plaintiff can effectively deny recovery by the plaintiff or place an
undue burden to pay the judgment on one defendant. To avoid the
possibility that a jury will mistakenly speculate on the effects of its
answers and to give effect to the jury's decision regarding recovery,
Washington should join states allowing courts to inform juries of the
effects of negligence law.
In Washington, both plaintiffs and defendants can use the trap that
joint and several liability creates. A defendant can argue that, in fair-
ness, the jury should assign a small percentage of fault to the plaintiff.
The uninformed jury will not know that assignment of a small per-
centage of fault to the plaintiff has significant legal consequences. The
jury's lack of knowledge may cause it to consider as trivial the assign-
ment of a few percentage points of fault to the plaintiff. If the jury
considers the assignment unimportant, it may comply with the
defense's request without closely examining the :Facts to see if the
assignment is warranted.
A jury might not consider this determination to be significant for
two reasons. First, the assignment of a few percentage points of fault
may seem warranted on first glance. In most accidents, the victim
could have reacted to danger differently. For example, in the accident
between Ann and Bob described earlier, Bob may reasonably argue
that Ann should have swerved when she saw Bob's car coming toward
her. Bob may argue that Ann's failure to swerve was contributory
negligence. Ann's reaction, however, was not negligence but was, in
reality, natural under the circumstances. An uninformed jury may
assign a small percentage of fault to Ann, either believing her reaction
was minimally negligent or wishing to underscore how little her reac-
tions contributed to the accident. This mild reprimand may have the
unintended consequence of eliminating joint liability between
defendants.
A second reason the jury may consider the assignment of a small
percentage of fault to be insignificant is created by the comparative
negligence system itself. In its explanation of comparative negligence,
the court tells the jury that the plaintiff's damages will be reduced by
the percentage of fault caused by the plaintiff.88 When the jury is
awarding large damages, reducing the damage award by a few percent-
age points leaves the plaintiff with a large recovery. Without knowl-
edge of the legal consequences of an assignment of fault to the
plaintiff, such as those created by joint liability, the jury may not fully
examine the facts to determine if the assignment is warranted. The
88. WASHINGTON PA=RN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 26, 11.01.
470
Vol. 67:457, 1992
Jury Instructions on Joint & Several Liability
jury may mean only to lessen the liability of the defendant but may
actually prevent the plaintiff from recovering most of the judgment.
If the plaintiff is allowed to explain the effects of the finding, how-
ever, the jury may consider the assignment of fault more closely. In
this examination the jury may differentiate between a lack of ordinary
care and normal reactions to a dangerous situation. The jury may also
realize that their determination of fault must be accurate to warrant
the possible consequences. Ultimately, an informed jury's assignment
of fault will accurately reflect their determination of fault and not be a
gesture of false fairness to the defense.
A pitfall may also exist from the defendant's point of view. Often
plaintiffs join a city, county, school, hospital, large corporation, or
other "deep pocket" defendant in a negligence action solely for the
purpose of imposing joint and several liability. 9 An argument by the
plaintiff that this defendant contributed a few percentage points to an
injury is often plausible. Unless the jury is informed of the effects of
joint and several liability, the jury may think this defendant will only
be liable for a small contribution to the total damage award and the
main defendant will be liable for the remainder. In reality, this deep
pocket defendant may be liable for the entire award, with little hope of
contribution from the party that is mainly at fault. Once again, a
jury's uninformed determination to administer a mild reprimand may
victimize a defendant.
The elimination of the trap created when a jury unknowingly cre-
ates joint liability has positive results. One positive consequence is the
accurate determination that joint liability is warranted, instead of an
arbitrary allocation of fault based on sympathy, bias or faulty reason-
ing. A second positive consequence is the elimination of the possibility
that the jury's intent may be frustrated by the application of joint
liability.
2 Inaccurate Jury Speculation on Washington Law May Create
Erroneous Results
The likelihood that uninformed jurors will make inequitable find-
ings based on a false idea of the law outweighs the risk that an
informed jury will base their findings on bias, sympathy, or prejudice.
Jurors may know the effects of their answers from prior experience,
89. Pressler & Schieffer, supra note 15, at 652 ; see Carol A. Mutter, Moving to Comparative
Negligence in an Era of Tort Reform: Decisions for Tennessee, 57 TENN. L. REv. 199, 307 (1990);
see also Kaeo v. Davis, 719 P.2d 387 (Haw. 1986) (joinder of city); Luna v. Shockey Sheet Metal
& Welding Co., 743 P.2d 61 (Idaho 1987) (joinder of corporation); Seaton v. Wyoming Highway
Comm'n, 784 P.2d 197 (Wyo. 1989) (joinder of state).
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from the media, or from friends, acquaintances or relatives.' A juror
or someone a juror knows may have learned of negligence law from
involvement in the court system as a litigant or a juror. In addition,
the law is often discussed in the media. Movies, television, and novels
dramatize legal actors and concepts, and broadcast and print media
report the developments in legal proceedings. Erroneous prior knowl-
edge of the law or mistaken ideas developed during the course of the
trial can lead a juror to speculate on how the jury's answers to special
verdict questions will effect the outcome of the case.
Juror's outside knowledge is unlikely to reflect the current status of
Washington law. The legal concepts represented in the media are
presented for dramatic effect. These concepts are not presented by
trained legal experts and may be inaccurate or oversimplified. Experi-
ence gained from other states is not consistent with Washington law.
Similarly, knowledge gained from the juror's or another's experience
with Washington negligence law prior to 1986 no longer represents
Washington joint and several liability.
Jurors may also form ideas of the law while serving on the jury. In
Seppi, the Idaho court noted that after listening to the arguments of
counsel and the testimony of witnesses, most jurors will have formed
conclusions about how their answers will affect the parties.91 With the
complexities of Washington's joint and several liability, uninformed
speculation will probably be incorrect. Jurors are unlikely to realize
that the plaintiff's insistence on a total freedom from fault is an effort
to create joint liability. Nor is the jury likely to conclude that a minor
defendant is arguing that the plaintiff was also at fault to avoid liability
for the entire award. Instead, the jury will see each party placing
blame on the other.
The ultimate result when a jury alters its answers to produce the
results it desires based on incorrect assumptions, no matter how they
reached these assumptions, may be contrary to their actual findings
and will probably not reflect the jury's intent. To prevent the injustice
that results when an arbitrary judgment or one based on false informa-
tion is returned, courts should instruct juries on joint and several
liability.
90. See Martin A. Kotler, Reappraising the Jury's Role as Finder of Fact, 20 GA. L. REv. 123,
141-45 (1985). Professor Kotler states that the "problem of having the jury return a verdict
based, at least in part, on extra-judicial or idiosyncratic knowledge or belief, or on speculation
based upon such knowledge or belief is one which has plagued trial lawyers and litigants
probably for as long as juries have been deciding cases." Id. at 143.
91. Seppi v. Betty, 579 P.2d 683, 689-90 (Idaho 1978).
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B. Informing Juries Is Consistent With Washington Tort Policy and
Practice
The reforms in Washington tort law enacted by the Legislature to
create fairness and to decrease insurance costs will be frustrated if
courts do not inform juries of Washington joint and several liability.
In addition, the reasoning of courts addressing similar issues is persua-
sive. Finally, previous Washington court practice and Washington
Court Rules are consistent with courts informing juries.
1. Informing the Jury Is Consistent With the Policy Behind
Washington Negligence Law
The Washington Legislature reformed the state's tort law to accom-
plish two goals. The first was to eliminate the harsh rules of common
law negligence that denied recovery by injured plaintiffs for trivial or
overly technical reasons. 92 The second was to decrease insurance
costs.93 Both these policies are defeated when courts are forbidden
from informing the jury of the effects of joint and several liability.
The Legislature's desire to make negligence law more fair will be
frustrated if a jury is not informed of joint and several liability. The
application of the Washington doctrine of joint and several liability
can have harsh consequences similar to those of common law doc-
trines such as contributory negligence. Washington juries, however,
were aware of the effect of a finding of contributory negligence. 94 The
decision of a jury deciding to find contributory negligence represented
a determination that the severe consequences of the doctrine were war-
ranted because the jury had full knowledge of the effects of its answers.
A jury that is not informed of joint and several liability is not allowed
to determine whether the consequences of the doctrine are war-
ranted. 95 Instead, the jury's decision only reflects an ignorance of
Washington law.
Informing the jury of the effect of joint and several liability also
accomplishes the legislative policy of decreasing insurance costs. The
Legislature's goal was to distribute equitably the costs of injury.96 The
Legislature believed an equitable distribution would lead to lower
92. See Act of April 4, 1986, ch. 305, § 100, 1986 Wash. Laws 1354, 1354; Act of April 17,
1981, clh. 27, § 1, 1981 Wash. Laws 112, 112; see also supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text
(harshness of contributory negligence led to enactment of comparative fault).
93. See Act of April 4, 1986, ch. 305, § 100, 1986 Wash. Laws 1354, 1354; see also supra
notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
96. Act of April 4, 1986, ch. 305, § 100, 1986 Wash. Laws 1354, 1354.
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insurance rates.97 To determine the equitable distribution of the cost
of injury, a jury must know what that distribution will be. To effectu-
ate the Legislature's goal of equitably distributing injury and eventu-
ally lowering insurance rates, the jury should base its decision to
assign fault to the parties, including the plaintiff, on an understanding
of the consequences.
2. Washington Precedent and Practice Indicate that Courts Should
Instruct Juries on Joint and Several Liability
Washington should treat an instruction on joint and several liability
in the same manner as abstract instructions on doctrines such as con-
tributory negligence and assumption of risk. Under those doctrines,
the court informed the jury of the effect of its answers on the ultimate
outcome. Washington courts instructed the jury of the effects regard-
less of any sympathy or bias the instruction might have produced.
The knowledge that the assignment of fault to the plaintiff will defeat
joint liability is no more likely to alter the jury's answers than the
knowledge that a finding of contributory negligence or assumption of
risk would completely bar recovery.
Washington Court Rule 49 is another indicator favoring the instruc-
tion of juries on joint and several liability. Under Rule 49, the court is
not required to limit the jury to special verdicts.98 A court may sub-
mit the questions required under the Washington comparative fault
statute as interrogatories accompanying a general verdict.99 When the
court submits a general verdict, the judge may charge the jury on the
relevant abstract principles of law, including joint and several liabil-
ity.100 Instructing the jury on joint and several liability for a general
verdict but not for a special verdict may make the outcome of the case
dependent on the form of the verdict and not the facts of the case.
This anomaly, possible only if courts may not instruct juries on joint
and several liability when using a special verdict, contradicts the
Washington Legislature's desire to create a distribution of losses that
conforms with the principles of equity and fairness. Therefore, for
Rule 49 to make sense and be consistent, courts should instruct juries
on joint and several liability.
Rule 49 also requires that when a court submits a special verdict,
the court must give the jury any instructions or explanations that may
97. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
98. WASH. CT. R. 49; see also Basr et al., supra note 11, § 3.30(2)(b).
99. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
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be necessary to enable the jury to make its findings. 01 This is the
same requirement that the Hawaii'0 2 and the Montana10 3 courts held
permitted courts to inform juries of the effects of joint and several lia-
bility."° Although these courts supplied little justification for their
holdings, the results conform with Washington tort policy. To make
the fair and equitable apportionment of fault that the Washington
Legislature desired, the jury must know what the effects of their
apportionment will be. Informing the jury is therefore necessary to
the equitable determination of fault, and it is consistent with the
requirement in Rule 49 that the court provide instruction that may be
necessary to enable the jury to make its findings.
3. The Decisions of Other States are Persuasive
Both the decisions of courts that address the informing of juries in
modified comparative negligence cases, and those addressing the
informing of juries of common law joint and several liability are per-
suasive. The problems that comparative negligence creates in other
states are analogous to those that Washington joint and several liabil-
ity creates.0 5 Washington joint and several liability also creates a trap
for the uninformed jury.0 6 A lack of knowledge about joint and sev-
eral liability may mislead juries in a manner similar to modified com-
parative negligence. 0 7 Under either doctrine, a one percent difference
in the percentage of fault assigned to the plaintiff has potentially huge
and unforeseen consequences. ' 08 In addition, Washington courts have
a history of allowing the jury to deliberate with full knowledge of the
consequences of its actions. Other states recognize that no change in
this practice is necessary when the common law is modified. 109 Like
states addressing similar issues, Washington courts should instruct
juries to overcome the problems created when a jury is not informed of
the effects of its answers.
101. WASH. Cr. R. 49.
102. Kaeo v. Davis, 719 P.2d 387, 394 (Haw. 1986).
103. Decelles v. State ex rel Dept. of Highways, 795 P.2d 419, 421 (Mont. 1990).
104. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 52-68 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 52-68, 86-89 and accompanying text.
108. In modified comparative negligence, one percentage point of fault may be the difference
between recovery and no recovery. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. Similarly, the
difference, for all practical purposes, between a Washington plaintiff being one percent negligent
and zero percent negligent may be the difference between full recovery and marginal recovery.
109. See supra note 68.
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C. Washington Courts Should Institute the Proposed Allowance of
Jury Instructions on Joint and Several Liability
Although both Washington courts and the Legislature could create
a rule in favor of jury instructions, judicial creation of a new rule by
judicial decision is the best method. While legislative creation of a
new rule has advantages, the reality of politics makes the rule's crea-
tion unlikely. Because there is no case law on the subject, a court rule
on informing juries is also improbable. The best solution, therefore, is
the creation of a new rule through judicial decision.
1. Legislative Creation of a Rule
The Legislature could amend the Washington code to require that
trial courts inform juries of the effects of their verdicts.110 Several
states have chosen this alternative in order to inform juries of the
effects of modified comparative negligence."1 None, however, have
chosen legislative adoption of a rule to permit informing the jury of
joint and several liability.
The failure of legislatures to act on the issue of informing a jury of
joint and several liability may result from the realities of the legislative
process. Without pressure from an interest group, legislators are
unlikely to propose legislation allowing juries to be informed because
of time demands or a lack of awareness or understanding of the prob-
lem. However, unorganized groups experience difficulty in initiating
the legislative process. Potential plaintiffs are a diverse group and are
not likely to be concerned about the informing of juries until after
their trial. Deep pocket defendants may be an organized group, but
they may not initiate legislation because of a resistance to change or a
perception that the rule may injure their interests. Despite concern
and potential harms, therefore, a legislative solution to the current
problem is unlikely.
2. A New Court Rule is Unlikely
The Washington Supreme Court has the power to regulate and cre-
ate rules governing the character of practice and procedure within the
courts of the state.1 2 A court rule may be an appropriate method of
creating the rule because informing the jury is a procedural issue. The
110. See Sofle v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wash. 2d 636, 666, 771 P.2d 711, 727 (1989)
(legislature may prescribe factors to take into consideration in determining liability).
111. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
112. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 2.04.190 (West 1989).
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Judicial Council that formulates Washington's court rules,113 how-
ever, is unlikely to create a rule allowing courts to inform the jury in
the absence of case law on the subject."' The Judicial Council, in
general, creates court rules to solve problems. Until several courts
have addressed informing the jury and have produced differing results,
the issue of informing the jury is not pressing enough to attract the
attention of the Judicial Council.
3. Judicial Decision Is the Best Way to Create a Rule Allowing
Informing of Juries
A court decision is the most practical, probable, and logical means
of creating a new rule allowing courts to inform juries of joint and
several liability when a party requests instruction. Courts are in a
good position to evaluate the possible forms of a rule because courts
see the effects of the rules they apply and create first hand. The rule
will effect judicial proceedings and outcomes. The research required
to understand these effects is equally available to courts and legisla-
tures because it lies mostly in the experiences of other states that have
judicially adopted similar rules. Courts are better able than legisla-
tors, however, to understand the legal intricacies involved in the crea-
tion and implementation of a new rule.
Additionally, litigants are better able to represent opposing views on
the issue than are legislative interest groups. In general, the peoples'
representatives should create laws, not the courts. Both potential
plaintiffs and defendants in joint and several liability actions are repre-
sented among the constituents of each legislator. In reality, however,
representation is unlikely to be even. The lobbying power of potential
defendants outweighs that of unidentifiable future plaintiffs. The best
assurance of vigorous representation for both sides is the actual con-
troversy of a tort action. A judicial solution, moreover, does not cir-
cumvent the legislative process. A legislative determination of the
issues that the modification creates may be proper because the Wash-
ington Legislature created the modified doctrine. A judicial rule
would not invade the province of the Legislature because there has
been no legislative action on the subject. A rule on informing juries
would not preclude legislative action and does not contradict previous
legislative decisions.
113. See Hugh Spitzer, Court Rulemaking in Washington State, 6 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv.
31, 46 n.85 (1982).
114. See generally Cornelius J. Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of
Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. Rv. 265 (1963).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Washington Legislature's modification of the common law doc-
trine of joint and several liability may arbitrarily create or deny joint
liability and frustrate an uninformed jury's intent. Neither the Wash-
ington Legislature nor the Washington Supreme Court has addressed
the issue of informing juries of joint and several liability. Washington
courts should inform juries of joint and several liability and its effects.
Informed juries are aware of the judgment resulting from their assign-
ment of fault. This awareness encourages careful consideration of the
facts in each case and prevents parties' deliberate misleading of the
jury and unintentional frustration of the outcome that the jury
intended.
Julie K. Weaver
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